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various domestic and international business interests and upon taking office was sued and it was 
claimed he was in violation of the foreign and domestic emoluments clauses. The OLC was not 
consulted on the question of whether President Trump could continue to receive payments 
through his businesses as president. This article proposes that had the OLC been asked it would 
have concluded that the president was in violation of both clauses to the extent that any profits 
and payments received were sourced from government entities, whether foreign or domestic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  The role of the Attorney General and the Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) is to provide the President and members of the executive branch with 
advice regarding the legality of proposed actions or proposed legislation.
1
  The 
advice provided by the Attorney General and the OLC is considered binding 
and determinative on the executive branch.
2
  The Emoluments Clause of 
Article II of the United States Constitution prohibits the President from 
receiving an emolument outside of his proscribed salary.
3
  Subsequent to his 
election, Donald Trump has been sued in three separate cases in which it was 
asserted that he received emoluments outside of his proscribed salary and as 
a result violated the Emoluments Clause.
4
 
The OLC has issued more than twenty opinions on the applicability and 
purpose of the Emoluments Clause and has defined each of its prohibitions 
and enforcement within the executive branch.  The two emoluments clauses
5
 
of relevance to the executive branch are located in Article I and Article II of 
the Constitution: the first commonly referred to as the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause and the second as the Domestic Emoluments Clause.  The majority of 
OLC opinions focus on the Foreign Emoluments Clause and this precedent 
provides a basis for defining the Domestic Emoluments Clause. 
This Article was part of the Volume 22 Symposium presented by the 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law in Fall 2020, in 
which it was proposed that the OLC has developed a significant body of law 
on the meaning and application of the Emoluments Clause and the OLC’s 
jurisprudence on the clauses establishes that the purpose of the clauses has 
been to prevent undue influence or corruption of government officials.
6
  The 
clauses are not concerned with the amount of the emolument that is received 
by the government official but the fact that it is received.
7
 While the 
Constitution and OLC jurisprudence on the emolument clauses are clear that 
they apply to the President, the Constitution is not as clear on how or whether 
the clauses can be enforced in court, against a president who accepts an 
 
1 Infra Part I. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Infra Part II. 
 4 Id. 
 5 The third clause refers to Congress.  See infra note 27. 
 6 Infra Part II. 
 7 Id. 
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emolument, due to issues of standing.
8
  This inability to establish standing to 
enforce the Emoluments Clause in court has led to the possible conclusion 
that the clauses cannot be enforced.  Thus, the only possibility in changing this 
practical impossibility is for Congress to act and legislatively require the 
President to be covered by the clause and provide Congress, as a whole, and 
specifically individual members of Congress and/or private parties, with 
standing to assert the violation of the clause in court.  Such legislation would 
also need to specifically provide for judicially enforceable remedies to 
presidential violation of the clause. 
In Part I of this Article, a brief explanation of the purpose and significance 
of the OLC will be provided with a focus on why an opinion of the OLC 
matters within the executive branch. Part II will focus on the emoluments 
clauses as interpreted by the OLC. Part II will review the two types of 
emoluments and how they have been enforced within the executive branch 
including how they have been applied to past presidents. Part III will focus on 
the applicability of both clauses on the business activities of President Trump.  
Part III will conclude that the Foreign Emoluments Clause clearly applies to 
President Trump’s international ventures and the Domestic Emoluments 
Clause applies to his domestic ventures with the caveat that source of these 
emoluments must originate from individual states or from agencies within 
those governments or foreign governments or from agencies within those 
governments.  Neither clause affects or prohibits his financial endeavors or 
receipt of emoluments from private individuals or entities. 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE AND POWER OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND 
OLC TO MAKE SURE THE LAW IS FAITHFULLY EXECUTED WITHIN THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
The power of the United States Attorney General and the OLC to opine 
on what the law means within the executive branch is based on the interaction 
between the Article II power granted to the President, the creation of the 
Attorney General under the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the power of the 
President to request written advice from his executive departments under 
Article II.  The President under Article II, “shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed”
9
 and the Attorney General under the Judiciary Act of 
1789, shall be 
 
 8 Id. 
 9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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a meet person, learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the United 
States, who shall be sworn or affirmed to a faithful execution of his office; 
whose duty it shall be to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court 
in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and 
opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the United 
States, or when requested by the heads of any of the departments, touching 
any matters that may concern their departments, and shall receive such 
compensation for his services as shall by law be provided.
10
 
This statutory authorization of the Attorney General to advise the 
President and Cabinet supplemented Article II which authorizes the President 
to, “require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the 




One of the significant aspects of the office of the Attorney General is that 
of the original four cabinet officers, including the Secretary of State, Defense, 
and Treasury, the Attorney General was not created by a separate statute but 
was created within the statute that created the federal judiciary.
12
  The creation 
of the Attorney General within the Judiciary Act of 1789 has provided support 
for the proposition that the office is considered a quasi-judicial office when the 
Attorney General is “giv[ing] his advice and opinion upon questions of law 
when required by the President of the United States, or when requested by 
the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may concern 




Subsequently to the passage of the Judiciary Act and almost a century and 
a half of opinions and growth of the office of Attorney General, President 
Woodrow Wilson formally recognized that the Attorney General was 
determinative regarding the meaning of the law within the executive branch in 
his Executive Order 2877, which he issued in 1918: 
 
10 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (emphasis added).  The Judiciary Act also created 
the office U.S. District Attorney, later changed to U.S. Attorney, in which, “there shall be appointed 
in each district a meet person learned in the law to act as attorney for the United States in such district, 
who shall be sworn or affirmed to the faithful execution of his office, whose duty it shall be to 
prosecute in such district all delinquents for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of 
the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned, except before 
the supreme court . . . .”  Id. 
 11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 12 For general discussion on the history of the Attorney General, see Arthur H. Garrison, The Opinions 
by the Attorney General and the Office of Legal Counsel: How and Why They Are Significant, 76 
ALB. L. Rev. 217 (2013). 
 13 Id. at 230, 238 (citation omitted). 
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Whereas, in order to avoid confusion in policies, duplication of effort, and 
conflicting interpretations of the law, unity of control in the administration of 
the legal affairs of the Federal Government is obviously essential, and has been 
so recognized by the acts of Congress creating and regulating the Department 
of Justice; 
Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, by 
virtue of the authority vested in me as Chief Executive and by the act 
“authorizing the President to coordinate or consolidate executive bureaus, 
agencies and offices, and for other purposes, in the interest of economy and 
the more efficient concentration of the Government,” approved May 20, 
1918, do hereby order that all law officers of the Government . . . . shall 
“exercise their functions under the supervision and control of the head of the 
Department of Justice,” in like manner as is now provided by law with respect 
to the Solicitors for the principal Executive Departments and similar officers; 
that all litigation in which the United States or any Department, executive 
bureau, agency or office thereof, are engaged shall be conducted under the 
supervision and control of the head of the Department of Justice; and that any 
opinion or ruling by the Attorney General upon any question of law arising in 
any Department, executive bureau, agency or office shall be treated as binding 
upon all departments, bureaus, agencies or offices therewith concerned. This 
Order shall not be construed as affecting the jurisdiction exercised under 
authority of existing law by the Comptroller of the Treasury and the Judge 
Advocates General of the Army and Navy.
14 
 This executive order was affirmed and continued by the Executive Order 
6166 issued by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on June 10, 1933, which 
placed all department solicitors, U.S. Attorneys, and U.S. Marshalls under the 
direction of the Justice Department.
15
  To further facilitate the authority of the 
Attorney General Congress created the position Assistant Solicitor General in 
1933
16
 as head of the Justice Department Civil Division which was tasked with 
preparing legal opinions from the Attorney General and reviewing 
declarations that would be issued by the President.
17
  Under Executive Orders 
6247 (on August 10, 1933) and 7298 (February 18, 1936) issued by President 
Franklin Roosevelt, all proposed executive orders and proclamations were to 
be submitted to the Assistant Solicitor General for review before final 
 
 14 Exec. Order No. 2877 (May 31, 1918) (emphasis added). 
 15 Exec. Order No. 6166, § 5 (June 10, 1933).  This executive order provided support for legislation 
that placed all U.S. Attorneys and U.S. Marshalls under the Attorney General.  See also An Act 
Concerning the Attorney-General and the Attorneys and Marshalls of the Several Districts, ch. 37, § 
1, 2 Stat. 285 (1861) (“[T]he Attorney General of the United States be . . . charged with the general 
superintendence and direction of the attorneys and marshals of all the districts in the United States . 
. . .”); An Act to Authorize the Commencement and Conduct of Legal Proceedings Under the 
Direction of the Attorney General, ch. 3935, 34 Stat. 816 (1906) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 515(a) (2006)) (explaining the authority of the Attorney General). 
 16 Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1934, ch. 101, § 16, 48 Stat. 283, 307–08 (1933). 
 17 Garrison, supra note 12, at 234. 
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consideration by the Attorney General for publication by the President.
18
  The 
Civil Division was subsequently disbanded and the Assistant Solicitor General 
was placed directly under the supervision of the Attorney General under the 
Office of the Assistant Solicitor General.
19
  In 1950, in compliance with the 
Reorganization Act of 1949, the Office of the Assistant Solicitor General was 
eliminated as part of the 1950 Justice Department reorganization plan and a 
new office, the Executive Adjudications Division under an Assistant Attorney 




The daily operation of the power of the Attorney General to provide legal 
opinions to the President and other executive offices was transferred from the 
Attorney General to the Assistant Solicitor General in 1933 which was 
transferred to the OLC in 1953.
21
  While the final authority to deal with 
disputes of law remains with the Attorney General, in 1979 President Carter 
issued Executive Order 12146 which required any dispute between two or 
more executive agencies to be submitted to the Attorney General, and the 
OLC has subsequently determined that the executive order places a 
requirement for final adjudication by the OLC and that the OLC 




II. THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSES AND THE OLC APPLICATION WITHIN 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
In America, the concern over corrupt enrichment of public officers 
predates the Constitution with the writing of the Articles of Confederation on 
 
 18 See Exec. Order No. 7298 (Feb. 18, 1936) (establishing the order of review for executive orders); 
Exec. Order No. 6247 (Aug. 10, 1933) (superseded by Exec. Order No. 7298) (establishing the old 
process for executive orders); 1937 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 125 (describing the new process for 
executive order submission and review); 1936 ATT’Y. GEN. ANN. REP. 119 (describing the 
President’s Executive Order establishing the new executive order review process). 
 19 Garrison, supra note 12, at 234.  
 20 Id. at 234–35. 
 21 Reorganization Act of 1949, ch. 226, 63 Stat. 203, 204 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 901–12 
(2006)); 1953 ATT’Y. GEN. ANN. REP. 168; 1952 ATT’Y. GEN. ANN. REP. 148; 1935 ATT’Y. GEN. 
ANN. REP. 129; 1934 ATT’Y. GEN. ANN. REP. 119. 
 22 See Exec. Order No. 12146, 44 Fed. Reg. 42657 (July 18, 1979) (describing the dispute resolution 
process); see also Application of the Davis-Bacon Act to Urban Development Projects That Receive 
Partial Federal Funding, 11 Op. O.L.C. 92, 92 (1987) (“This question arose pursuant to a dispute 
between the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development . . . . The 
Office of Legal Counsel has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute pursuant to Executive Order No. 
12146.”).  
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November 15, 1777 and its formal adoption on March 1, 1781, in which it 
made clear 
nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under 
the united states, for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, 
fees or emolument of any kind . . . [N]or shall any person holding any office 
of profit or trust under the united states, or any of them, accept any of present, 
emolument, office or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince or 
foreign State; nor shall the united states in congress assembled, or any of them, 
grant any title of nobility.
 23 
Note that “emolument of any kind” is a separate category of enrichment, 
listed alongside salary or fees, and it encompasses “any kind” of enrichment. 
In his famous Pacificus-Helvidius debate in the summer and fall of 1793 
with Alexander Hamilton writing as Pacificus defending President 
Washington’s declaration of neutrality during the war between France and 
Great Britain and asserting President Washington had the authority to 
unilaterally declare America neutral regardless of congressional opinion on 
the subject,
24
 James Madison, writing as Helvidius, reflected on the fear of 
financial corruption of the person in the presidency with the sole power to 
regulate foreign policy as follows: 
However proper or safe it may be in a government where the executive 
magistrate is an hereditary monarch to commit to him the entire power of 
making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper to entrust that power 
to an elective magistrate of four years duration.  It has been remarked . . . that 
an hereditary monarch, though often the oppressor of his people, has 
personally too much at stake in the government to be in any material danger 
of being corrupted by foreign powers.  But that a man raised from the station 
of a private citizen to the rank of chief magistrate, possessed of but a moderate 
or slender fortune, and looking forward to a period not very remote, when he 
may probably be obliged to return to the station from which he was taken, 
might sometimes be under temptations to sacrifice his duty to his interest, 
which it would require superlative virtue to withstand.  An avaricious man 
might be tempted to betray the interests of the state to the acquisition of 
wealth. An ambitious man might make his own aggrandizement, by the aid of 
a foreign power, the price of his treachery to his constituents.  The history of 
human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue, which 
would make it wise in a nation, to commit interests of so delicate and 
momentous a kind as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the 
 
 23 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, cl. 2; id. art. VI, cl. 1. 
 24 For discussion, see ARTHUR H. GARRISON, SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN TIMES OF 
NATIONAL CRISIS, TERRORISM, AND WAR: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 5–21 (2011) (“[O]ne side 
was supportive of neutrality in an effort to protect business and trade with Britain (Hamilton being 
the key leader of this interest) and those wanting to honor agreements with America’s Revolutionary 
War ally (Jefferson being the leader of this interest) on the other.”). 
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world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate, created and circumstanced, as 
would be a President of the United States.
25  
The U.S. Constitution reflects this concern in the emoluments clauses in 
which officers of the United States, including the President, are prohibited 
from accepting any emolument—financial or otherwise—from a foreign state or 
from any state domestically not authorized by Congress.  The Constitution 
retained the same focus and language from the Articles of Confederation. 
The U.S. Constitution makes clear that various types of emoluments are 
prohibited.  Under the Foreign Emoluments Clause of Article I of the U.S. 26  
Constitution, “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And 
no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the 
Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, 
of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.” 
Under the Congressional Clause of Article I of the U.S. Constitution, 
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, 
be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, 
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been 
encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the 




Under the Domestic Emoluments Clause of Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution, 
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, 
which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which 
he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any 
other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.
 28
 
In 1856, Attorney General Caleb Cushing issued an opinion regarding the 
meaning of the word emoluments regarding “several acts of Congress, fixing 
the compensation of the collectors, and other officers, of the maritime revenue 
of the United States”
29
 to which he explained that the word emoluments in the  
compensation fund of the act of 1822 is not confined to these commissions, 
either in express terms or in legal intendment.  The word of this act is 
“emoluments,” which, the act proceeds to say, “shall not extend to fines, 
 
 25 “Helvidius” Number 4 [14 September] 1793, Founders Online, NATIONAL ARCHIVES (Original 
source: The Papers of James Madison, vol. 15, 24 March 1793 – 20 April 1795) (emphasis added) 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-15-02-0070. 
26     U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
 29 Comp. of Collectors of Customs, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 46, 46 (1856). 
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penalties, and forfeitures,” clearly implying that it shall comprehend all other 
ordinary sources of compensation . . . .
30
  
The dispute was whether, “the language of the act of 1841” prohibited 
compensation outside  
the money received in any one year by any collector, naval officer, or surveyor, 
on account (of,) and for rents, and storage, as aforesaid, and for fees and 
emoluments, shall in the aggregate exceed the sum of two thousand dollars, 
such excess shall be paid by the said collector, naval officer, or surveyor, as 




In other words: was the emoluments clause independent of fees and does 
it include commissions. Cushing concluded that emoluments was 
independent to fees and commissions, because the law required the return  
of all sums of money . . . respectively received or collected for fines, penalties, 
or forfeitures, or for seizure of goods, wares, or merchandise . . .  beyond the 
rents paid by the collector or other such officer; and . . . money received . . . 
by any collector, naval officer, or surveyor . . . shall in the aggregate exceed 
two thousand dollars, such excess shall be paid by the said collector, naval 




Cushing concluded, “[a]re not the receipts of a collector from all these 




Thus, in an early official adjudication of the term, it was determined by the 
Attorney General that “emoluments” is financial gain or enhancement that is 
outside of fees, commission or other payments authorized by Congress.  
Opinions both before and after Cushing’s opinion make clear that an 
emolument is a financial gain outside of a regular fee structure.
34
  In simple 
terms any outside gain is an enrichment, which is an emolument and financial 
gain is not exclusive in defining what is an emolument.
35
  When used with other 
 
 30 Id. at 54. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 55. 
 33 Id. at 56. 
 34 See Pay and Emoluments of Paymaster, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 220, 220 (1829); Naval Officers Serving as 
Bureau Chiefs—Rank and Emoluments, 28 Op. Att’y Gen. 531, 531 (1910); Retired Pay of Surgeon-
Gen. Finley, 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 76, 76 (1872); Pay of Acting Quartermaster Gen., 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 
261, 264 (1837); Comp. of Marshal of the D.C., 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 458, 458 (1863). 
 35 See Application of Emoluments Clause to Part-Time Consultant for the Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 
10 Op. O.L.C. 96, 98–99 (1986) (“[P]ast Attorney Generals have stated that the Clause is ‘directed 
against every kind of influence by foreign governments upon officers of the United States’ in absence 
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categories of enrichments, emoluments are listed as a source of enrichment 
independent of other listed categories.
36
  The context of these opinions was 
whether a person had a right to the emoluments outside of other fee structures.  
Various Attorneys General opinions settled that the definition of emoluments 
 
of consent of Congress . . . .[T]he Emoluments Clause, [is] aimed at preventing corruption and extra-
government influence.” (citations omitted)); Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Proposed Serv. 
of Gov’t Emp. on Comm’n of Int’l Historians, 11 Op. O.L.C. 89, 90 (1987) (“Consistent with its 
expansive language and underlying purpose, the provision has been interpreted as being ‘particularly 
directed against every kind of influence by foreign governments upon officers of the United States, 
based upon our historic policies as a nation.’ . . . [T]he Emoluments Clause is plainly applicable 
where an official is offered the gift, title or office in his private capacity.” (citations omitted)); Auth. 
of Foreign Law Enf’t Agents to Carry Weapons in the U.S., 12 Op. O.L.C. 67, 68-70 (1988) (“[The 
Emoluments Clause] . . . was intended by the Framers to preserve the independence of officers of 
the United States from corruption and foreign influence.  The Emoluments Clause must be read 
broadly in order to fulfill that purpose.  Accordingly, the Clause applies to all persons holding an 
office of profit or trust under the United States . . . At a minimum, it is well established that 
compensation for services performed for a foreign government constitutes an ‘emolument’ for 
purposes of the Emoluments Clause . . . .[D]ivided loyalty . . . is prohibited by the Emoluments 
Clause . . . .”); Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 219 to Members of Fed. Advisory Comms., 15 Op. 
O.L.C. 65, 67 (1991) (“The Emoluments Clause provides that absent congressional consent, a person 
holding an ‘Office of Profit or Trust’ under the United States may not hold any position in, or receive 
any payment from, a foreign government.”); Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Gov’t 
Members of ACUS, 17 Op. O.L.C. 114, 120 (1993) (“Accordingly, we conclude that . . . the 
Emoluments Clause would prohibit members of the Conference from accepting a share of 
partnership earnings, where some portion of that share is derived from the partnership’s 
representation of a foreign government.”); Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Emp. of Gov’t 
Emps. by Foreign Pub. Univs., 18 Op. O.L.C. 13, 18 (1994) (“Those who hold offices under the 
United States must give the government their unclouded judgement and their uncompromised 
loyalty.  That judgement might be biased, and that loyalty divided, if they received financial benefit 
from a foreign government, even when those benefits took the form of remuneration for academic 
work or research.”); Application of the Ineligibility Clause, 20 Op. O.L.C. 410, 410 (1996) (stating 
that the context of the Congressional Emoluments Clause is increase in salary of a position within the 
government); Emoluments Clause & the World Bank, 25 Op. O.L.C. 113, 114 (2001) (“[T]he 
prohibitions of the Emoluments Clause apply not only to constitutional officers . . . but also to 
government employees, ‘lesser functionaries’ who are subordinate . . . . The term ‘emolument’ . . . 
was intended to cover compensation of any sort arising out of an employment relationship with a 
foreign state.” (quoting Memorandum for S.A. Andretta, Administrative Assistant Attorney General, 
from J. Lee Rankin Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Payment of 
Compensation to Individual in Receipt of Compensation from a Foreign Government at 8 (Oct. 4, 
1954))). 
 36 See Comp. of Dist. Att’ys in Suits Against Revenue Officers, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 88, 89 (1864) (“The 
act of February 26, 1853, see. 3, requires every district attorney . . . to make to the Secretary of the 
Interior . . . ‘a return in writing, embracing all the fees and emoluments’ of his office, ‘of every name 
and character, distinguishing the fees and emoluments received or payable under the bankrupt act . 
. . .[And] no district attorney shall be allowed by the said Secretary of the Interior to retain of the fees 
and emoluments of his said office, for his own personal compensation, over and above his necessary 
office expenses . . . .”). 
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was an enrichment outside other fee structures.
37
  Attorney General Henry D. 
Gilpin opined on October 3, 1840 as to “whether a navy agent, employed to 
make purchases or perform any services for a department other than the Navy 
Department, can be allowed a commission or compensation for such 
services.”
38
  He concluded that under a 1839 act of congress, no person 




While these opinions were focused on statutory issues regarding 
emoluments, the office of the Attorney General has also issued opinions on 
the constitutional prohibition on officers of the United States receiving 
emoluments from foreign states and from within the United States.  The first 
case in which the Attorney General opined on the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause was in 1902.40  The clause has three parts: it prohibits (1) any “person 
holding any office of profit or trust under [the United States], (2) from 
“accept[ing] any present, emolument . . . of any kind”, (3) “from any king, 
prince or foreign state.”
41
  Attorney General Henry M. Hoyt was confronted 
with the question of whether the clause applies to a non-ruling prince of 
Germany who gave to the German embassy presents for the Navy 
Department, West Point, and the Naval Academy in appreciation to his visit 
to America.
42
  Specifically, General Hoyt said the question is, “whether the 
constitutional provision . . . may be construed as applying only to a reigning 
prince, in which case the authority of Congress for the delivery of these 
presents would not be required.”
43
 
General Hoyt opined that “from any king, prince, or foreign state” clause 
“language has been viewed as particularly directed against every kind of 
influence by foreign governments upon officers of the United States” thus “it 
would not, in my judgment, be sound to hold that a titular prince, even if not 
a reigning potentate, is not included in the constitutional prohibition.”
44
  
General Hoyt explained that since the purpose of the clause is government 
influence on officers of the United States, the significance of “any king, prince, 
 
 37 See Comp. to Judges for Extra Servs., 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 589, 589 (1840); Brevet Pay of Gens. Gaines 
& Scott, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 564, 564 (1822); Fees of Marshals, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 176, 176 (1858); 
Member of Congress—Appointment to Office, 21 Op. Att’y Gen. 211, 211 (1895). 
 38 Comp. to Navy Agents for Extra Servs., 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 588, 588 (1840). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Gifts from Foreign Prince—Officer—Const. Prohibition, 24 Op. Att’y Gen. 116, 116–18 (1902). 
41  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 42 Id. at 117. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 117-18. 
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or foreign state” is in the power to act officially representing the government 
or otherwise act in the name of that government.  Because, “a titular prince, 
although not reigning, might have the function of bestowing an office or title 
of nobility or decoration, which would clearly fall under the prohibition.”
45
  
Hoyt opined, as the OLC would make clear in later decades, that the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause applies to the possibility of corrupting influence, not 
actual corrupting influence.  Because the Prince could bestow a title or office, 
that ability placed him within the clause.  He further opined that, “it must be 
observed that even a simple remembrance of courtesy . . . like the photographs 
in this case, falls under the inclusion of ‘any present . . . of any kind 
whatever.’”
46
  After making clear that the clause applies to all persons holding 
an office under the United States and that any present is covered and any 
representative of the foreign state is covered, he qualified the application of 
the clause to focus on persons.  He concluded that, “the constitutional 
prohibition expressly and exclusively relates to official persons, it could not 
properly be extended, under the circumstances at all events, in my judgment, 
to a department of the Government and to governmental institutions.”
47
  The 
result was that the embassy could accept the gifts without congressional 
approval because they were gifts to the United States and its institutions and 
not a gift to persons who were holders of an office of trust under the United 
States. 
In 1909, Attorney General George W. Wickersham was asked by the 
Department of the Navy whether it could accept and allow the Secretary of 
State to accept and bestow upon “Capt. N. M. Brooks, a clerk of class 4 in the 
Post-Office Department the insignia of the third class of the Order of the Red 
Eagle conferred upon him by the German Emperor.”
48
  General Wickersham 
focused on the status of Captain Brooks and concluded that since he is under 
the civil service law, Brooks holds an appointment in the Post Office 
Department and has a set and established salary for work and services 
rendered in that department and that,  
his duties are continuing and permanent, and not occasional and 
temporary.  He is, therefore, an inferior officer of the United States within 
the meaning of that clause of Article II, section 2, of the Constitution . . . 
It follows, therefore, that in the absence of a special consent obtained from 
 
 45 Id. at 118. 
 46 Id. (second alteration in original).  
 47 Id. 
 48 George W. Wickersham, Delivery of an Insignia from the German Emperor to a Clerk in the Post-
Office Dep’t, 27 Op. Att’y Gen. 219, 220 (1909). 
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Congress, Mr. Brooks is inhibited from accepting the insignia in question, 
by the last clause of, Article I, section 9 . . . .”
49
 
General Wickersham concluded that the reach of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause is broad in that it reached presidential level officers and 
department heads as well as persons that are inferior level government officers. 
It is not intended to imply that a present of the kind mentioned in the above-
quoted clause of the Constitution can be accepted by any and every employee 
of the Government other than those appointed by the President, the courts of 
law, and the heads of departments; but the office here in question is clearly 
one of that character, and is, therefore, recognized by the Constitution, and 
there can be no question that the inhibition applies to its incumbent.
50
 
On February 3, 1911, General Wickersham opined as to whether,  
Prof. J. A. Udden, special assistant on the United States Geological Survey, 
may accept from the King of Sweden the order of the “Knighthood of the 
North Star,” which that Sovereign has conferred on him, in view of Article 
I, section 9, paragraph 8, of the Constitution of the United States.
51
  
General Wickersham wrote that although Udden was employed by the 
United States under civil service law and that he “is employed by the chief 
geologist, with the approval of the director, under authority of the Civil Service 
Commission,”
52
 his employment was for an indefinite term and he was paid 
day by day, his employment status did not require an oath, and his duties did 
not require continuous service.
53
  “Under these conditions I am of the opinion 
that Professor Udden can not be called an officer under the United States 
within the meaning of the provision above quoted.”
54
  Thus, “I have the honor, 
therefore, to advise you that there is nothing in the Constitution or laws to 
prevent the acceptance by Professor Udden of the order conferred upon him 
by the King of Sweden.”
55
 
The opinions by Generals Hoyt and Wickersham make clear that the 
application and reach of the Foreign Emoluments Clause is to all persons who 
hold an office of employment in the United States which requires continuous 
service and one that is recognized by the constitution.  If covered, the type of 
present or emoluments is not relevant and congressional approval is required 
 
 49 27 Op. Att’y Gen. at 220–21. 
 50 Id. at 221 (emphasis added). 
 51 George W. Wickersham, Field Assistant on the Geological Surv.—Acceptance of an Order from the 
King of Sweden, 28 Op. Att’y Gen. 598, 598 (1912). 
 52 Id. at 599. 
 53 Id.  
 54 Id. (citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878)). 
 55 Id.  
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if the source of the emolument is from a foreign state or any representative 
thereof. Both made clear that such persons covered by the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause would require congressional approval to accept any 
emolument. Attorney General Tom Clark found congruence with these 
opinions and opined that a general congressional statute can be used to 
provide that approval. 
On April 17, 1947, General Clark opined on “the propriety of placing 
certain employees of the Weather Bureau on a leave-without-pay status and 
detailing them to serve as expert meteorologists for the Government of Eire.”
56
  
The question involved the nation of Eire and its request that the Department 
of Commerce allow and detail employees of the United States Weather 
Bureau to work with the Director of the Meteorological Service, Department 
of Industry and Commerce of Eire to provide training and other technical 
expertise for the development of its weather-forecasting service as well as its 
air navigation.
57
  Clark made a point in noting that the agreement was such that, 
“It is understood that the employees in question would retain their full United 
States citizenship and would not take any oath of allegiance to the Government 
of Eire.”
58
  Clark opined that the detailing of Americans to foreign nations was 
authorized by the act of August 8, 1946, which authorized, “the Chief of the 
Weather Bureau, under the direction of the Secretary of Commerce . . . [to] 
establish and coordinate the international exchanges of meteorological 
information required for the safety and efficiency of air navigation.”
59
  Clark 
concluded that since Congress had authorized such exchanges of information 
and that the detailed employees would retain their loyalty to the United States, 
the fact that the employees would be paid by Eire was not in conflict with the 
foreign emoluments clause because such an arrangement for payment was not 
prohibited by Congress and could have been anticipated by Congress.
60
 
On May 10, 1963, the OLC responded to the Attorney General’s request 
to respond to the National Security Advisor’s inquiry and opine on whether 
the President of the United States could accept an honorary Irish citizenship 
and whether such an act was violative of the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
61
  
This is the first published case in which the Foreign Emoluments Clause was 
applied to the president. The OLC was asked to determine whether the 
 
 56 Tom C. Clark, Comp. of Emps. Detailed to Assist Foreign Gov’ts, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 513, 513 (1947). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 514 
 60 Id. at 514–15. 
 61 Norbert A. Schlei, Proposal That the President Accept Honorary Irish Citizenship, 1 Op. O.L.C. 
Supp. 278, 278 (1963). 
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president could accept an honorary awarding of Irish citizenship from Ireland. 
The OLC concluded, 
[T]hat acceptance by the President of honorary Irish citizenship would fall 
within the spirit, if not the letter, of Article I, Section 9, Clause 8, of the 
Constitution which requires that an individual who holds an office of profit or 
trust under the United States must obtain the consent of Congress in order to 
accept “any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from 
any King, Prince or foreign State.”
62
 
The OLC explained that under current law, the Act of January 31, 1881,
63
 
the President could accept the award during formal ceremonies and deposit it 
with the Department of State and wait for congressional approval or have the 
award deposited with the State Department and then have the Department 
forward it to him upon his leaving office.
64
 
The OLC confirmed that Ireland law conferring the honorary citizenship 
would not carry any duties or responsibilities regarding loyalty to the nation of 
Ireland
65
 which affirmed the concern of General Clark in the aforementioned 
Compensation of Employees Detailed to Assist Foreign Governments 
opinion.  “Consequently, the problems which might have arisen as a result of 
dual citizenship are no longer presented.”
66
  In defining the meaning of the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause, the OLC held that the purpose of the clause 
was, “a means of preserving the independence of foreign ministers and other 
officers of the United States from external influences . . . . ‘[P]articularly 
directed against every kind of influence by foreign governments upon officers 
of the United States, based on our historic policies as a nation.’”
67
  The OLC 
determined that although the award would be the functional equivalent to a 
decoration or medal, “medals and decorations have always been regarded as 
coming within the constitutional provision.”
68
 Additionally, the 1881 federal 
law makes clear that:  
[A]ny present, decoration, or other thing, which shall be conferred or 
presented by any foreign government to any officer of the United States 
. . . shall be tendered through the Department of State, and not to the 
individual in person . . . [and] shall not be delivered by the Department 




 62 Id.  
 63 See 5 U.S.C. § 115 (1952) (codifying the Act of January 31, 1881). 
 64 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. at 278. 
 65 Id. at 279. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. (quoting Gifts from Foreign Prince, 24 Op. Att’y Gen. 116, 117 (1902)). 
 68 Id. at 280. 
 69 Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Act of January 31, 1881, 5 U.S.C. § 115). 
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The OLC advised the president that international social protocol practice 
and past policies would allow the President to accept the award on behalf of 
the United States or he could have the award deposited with the State 
Department to be held by the department until the President leaves office, or 
he could have the award handed to the American ambassador to Ireland who 
would accept it on behalf of the United States.
70
  But the OLC was clear in the 
fact that the Foreign Emoluments Clause as well as federal law applied to the 
President because he was an officer of the United States.
71
 
In 1981, the OLC was presented with the first application of the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause to the President which provides that the “President . . . 
shall not receive . . . any other Emolument from the United States, or any of 
them.”
72
  The legal question was, “whether the receipt by President Reagan of 
the retirement benefits to which he became entitled as the result of his service 
as Governor of the State of California conflicts with the Presidential 
Emoluments Clause of the Constitution.”
73
  The OLC first explained that the 
benefits of the California retirement were the result of the president making 
contributions to the state retirement system when he was a member of the 
California legislature and he was eligible to receive benefits after leaving office 
as Governor in 1975.  Thus, the payments under consideration are “vested 
rights . . . . [N]ot gratuities which the state is free to withdraw.”
74
 
The OLC explained that emoluments as used in Article II means, “profit 
or gain arising from station, office, or employment: reward, remuneration, 
salary.”
75
  The OLC held that the purpose of the prohibition of emoluments 
was to protect the President from corruption or the appearance of corruption 
and to protect the independence of his office, affirming General Hoyt in the 
aforementioned Gifts from Foreign Prince - Officer - Constitutional 
Prohibition 1902 case, “the term emolument has a strong connotation of, if it 
is not indeed limited to, payments which have a potential of influencing or 
corrupting the integrity of the recipient.”
76
  The determination is guided by 
“whether the payments were intended to influence, or had the effect of 
 
 70 See id. at 281–83 (explaining the options available for President Kennedy to accept honorary Irish 
citizenship, and also, in an addendum, presenting the proposal for him to the award). 
 71 Id. at 280. 
 72 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
 73 President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Ret. Benefits from the State of Cal., 5 Op. O.L.C. 187, 187 
(1981). 
 74 Id. at 187–88. 
 75 Id. at 188 (citation omitted). 
 76 Id. 
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influencing, the recipient as an officer of the United States.”
77
  In other words, 
“Article II, § 1, clause 7 has to be interpreted in the light of its basic purposes 
and principles, viz., to prevent Congress or any of the states from attempting 
to influence the President through financial awards or penalties.”
78
 
The OLC concluded that  
if Article II, § 1, clause 7 is to be interpreted only on the basis of the 
purposes it is intended to achieve, it would not bar the receipt by 
President Reagan of a pension in which he acquired a vested right 6 
years before he became President, for which he no longer has to 




The OLC reasoned that the benefits were earned before he became 
President, and more importantly, the receipt of those payments are not 
attached to any duties that he is currently performing and that California was 
not in a position to deny them.  The OLC explained that earned benefits are 
different from gratuities, which are presents, and benefits are not gifts or 
deferred compensation for services rendered, all of which are defined within 
emoluments.
80
 Thus the OLC concluded, the retirement benefits do not 
violate the Domestic Emoluments Clause, “because those benefits are not 
emoluments in the constitutional sense” and they don’t “violate the spirit” of 
the clause “because they do not subject the President to any improper 
influence” because benefits are not deferred payments subject to California 
actions of increasing or decreasing or withholding them.
81
 
The OLC was called upon to opine on the applicability of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause to the President in 2009 when President Obama was 
awarded the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize and the OLC had to determine if the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause prevented his acceptance of the award.
82
 Because 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause prohibits any person “holding any Office of 
Profit or Trust under [the United States]” from accepting “any present, 
Emolument . . . of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State” 
the OLC opined that the two issues to be decided is whether the president 
holds an office of profit or trust and secondly, whether the Nobel Foundation 
that makes the award is within the definition of “King, Prince, or foreign 
 
 77 Id. at 189. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 190. 
 80 Id. at 190–91. 
 81 Id. at 192. 
 82 David J. Barron, President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 370, 370 (2009) 
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State.”
83
 The first is self-evident in the affirmative,
84
 but as to the second, the 
OLC held that the Nobel Foundation was not within the definition of “King, 
Prince, or foreign State” and as such the Foreign Emoluments Clause did not 
apply and prevent the President from accepting the award.
85
 
The OLC jurisprudence of the definition of “King, Prince, or foreign 
State” in line with the definition of emoluments is the purpose of the 
emolument and the source of the emolument.
86
  In 1993 the OLC was asked 
to opine on whether non-government members of the Administrative 
Committee of the United States (ACUS) could receive distribution of revenue 
from partnerships that in part were received from foreign governments.
87
  The 
OLC reviewed the relationship between the ACUS member and their law firm 
and the foreign government-owned or controlled instrumentalities, businesses 
or proprietary corporation client interests and assessed whether the 
interposition of these entities between the foreign government and the ACUS 
member alleviates applicability of the foreign emoluments clause.
88
  The OLC 
determined that it did not because although it may be true that  
when foreign governments act in their commercial capacities, they do 
not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. . . . [N]othing in the text of 
the Emoluments Clause limits its applicability solely to foreign 
governments acting as sovereigns. . . . There is no express or implied 
exception for emoluments received from foreign States when the latter 
 
83  Id. (first alteration in original). 
 84 Id.  The OLC defines an “Office of Profit or Trust” and a person holding such an office includes a 
person who is required to take an oath, is expected to hold loyalty to the United States, exercises 
decision making authority regarding policy, exercises sovereign power under the laws of the United 
States, has a security clearance, has access to classified or confidential information as a result of the 
position held, governs domestic policy or government operations, has authority to enforce criminal 
law, holds an office that requires appointment and/or confirmation, holds an office by appointment 
of a constitutional officer, person holds a constitutional office, and/or holds an elected office.  The 
OLC has held that there is no one definitive definition but any combination of these factors 
establishes that the domestic and foreign emoluments clause will apply to the person who has a 
combination of these factors.  For a discussion on defining “Office of Profit or Trust,” see Proposal 
that the President Accept Honorary Irish Citizenship, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 278 (1963); Application 
of the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution & the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, 6 Op. 
O.L.C. 156 (1982); Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government Members of 
ACUS, 17 Op. O.L.C. 114 (1993); Application of the Emoluments Clause to a Member of the 
President’s Council on Bioethics, 29 Op. O.L.C. 55 (2005).   
 85 33 Op. O.L.C. at 370.  
 86 See generally supra notes 34–35. 
 87 17 Op. O.L.C. at 114. 
 88 Id. at 120.  
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The OLC explained that the purpose of the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
must be the focus of how its defined and applied. 
The language of the Emoluments Clause is both sweeping and 
unqualified.  It prohibits those holding offices of profit or trust under 
the United States from accepting “any present, Emolument, Office, or 
Title, of any kind whatever” from “any . . . foreign State” unless 
Congress consents. . . . We believe that the Emoluments Clause should 
be interpreted to guard against the risk that occupants of Federal office 
will be paid by corporations that are, or are susceptible of becoming, 
agents of foreign States, or that are typically administered by boards 
selected by foreign States.  Accordingly, we think that, in general, 
business corporations owned or controlled by foreign governments will 
fall within the Clause.
90 
The prohibition of “[a]ny . . . foreign State” is applied to any situation in 
which there is the “potential for corruption or improper foreign influence” on 
the person holding an office of the United States.
91
  James Madison stands 
affirmed. 
The OLC held that, “the language of the Emoluments Clause does not 
warrant any distinction between the various capacities in which a foreign State 
may act. Any emoluments from a foreign State, whether dispensed through its 
political or diplomatic arms or through other agencies, are forbidden to 
Federal office-holders (unless Congress consents).”
92
  The OLC concluded 
that the purpose of the clause defines its meaning and application. 
[F]oreign States even when they act through instrumentalities which, 
like universities, do not perform political or diplomatic functions.  
Those who hold offices under the United States must give the 
government their unclouded judgment and their uncompromised 
loyalty.  That judgment might be biased, and that loyalty divided, if they 
received financial benefits from a foreign government, even when 
those benefits took the form of remuneration for academic work or 
research.  Thus, United States Government officers or employees 
might well find themselves exposed to conflicting claims on their 




A year later the OLC continued to define what constitutes a “foreign State” 
under the foreign emoluments clause by reviewing a request regarding, 
 
 89 Id. at 120–21. 
 90 Id. at 121 (citations omitted). 
 91 Id. at 122. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. (citation and footnote omitted). 
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“whether foreign entities that are public institutions but not diplomatic, 
military, or political arms of their government should be considered to be 
‘foreign States’ for purposes of the Emoluments Clause. In particular, [the 
OLC has] been asked whether foreign public universities constitute ‘foreign 
State[s]’ under the Clause.”
94
  The OLC held “[f]oreign public universities are, 
presumptively, foreign states within the meaning of the Clause.”
95
  The OLC 
reasoned that a foreign government university is still under the control of a 
foreign government regardless of the fact that the university does not perform 
political, military or diplomatic functions of the foreign state.
96
  Foreign state 
control is sufficient to meet the “any . . . foreign State” threshold. 
But, the OLC held that in the specific case of the University of Victoria, 
the university was not within the clause because, “the University of Victoria is 
generally free from the control of the provincial government of British 
Columbia, we think that the evidence shows that the university is independent 
of that government when making faculty employment decisions.”
97
  The OLC 
was asked whether two government scientists with NASA while on leave could 
accept a teaching position at the University.
98
  Having determined that foreign 
universities as a group were covered by the Clause, the OLC stated that the 
purpose of the Clause—preventing possible corruption and influence on the 
loyalty of the officer—is served when the foreign government has no direct 
influence on the selection, employment or duties of the officer.
99
  The focus 
on the purpose of the foreign emoluments clause as the determiner of its 
meaning was supplemented in 2001 when the OLC opined on whether the 
World Bank was a foreign state.
100
  The OLC determined that it was not 
covered by the clause because the United States is a member of the World 
Bank and it would not make sense to hold that officers of the United States 
would be serving a foreign state when the United States is as a directing 
member of the World Bank.
101
 
With the OLC jurisprudence being clear that in defining the emoluments 
clause the focus is on its purpose and “foreign state” is defined by the 
governmental control over the entity providing the emolument, the OLC 
 
 94 Walter Dellinger, Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Employment of Government Employees 
by Foreign Public Universities, 18 Op. O.L.C. 13, 16 (1994). 
 95 Id. at 17. 
 96 Id. at 17–18. 
 97 Id. at 20. 
 98 Id. at 13. 
 99 Id. at 22. 
 100 Daniel L. Koffsky, Emoluments Clause and the World Bank, 25 Op. O.L.C. 113 (2001). 
 101 Id. at 115–116. 
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determined in 2009 that President Obama could accept the Nobel Prize 
because the award is not from a “foreign State.”
102
  Reviewing the structure and 
source of the prize, the OLC explained that the peace prize selection is made 
by the Nobel Prize Foundation which awards the peace prize through a 
process of deliberations in the Nobel Committee.
103
  The members of the 
Committee are selected by the Norwegian Parliament.
104
  Both by tradition and 
law, the Committee, although selected by the Norwegian Parliament, has 
functioned independently of the Parliament in all of its decisions and 
designations of peace awardees.
105
  Further, the funding for the prize is 
completely sourced from the Nobel Prize Foundation and not from the 
Norwegian Parliament.
106
  The OLC concluded that since the president holds 
an “Office of Profit or Trust” and that a prize is clearly a “present” or 
“emolument” the “critical question [is] the status of the institution that makes 
the reward. Based on . . . our Office’s precedents interpreting the Emoluments 
Clause in other contexts, we conclude that the President in accepting the Prize 
would not be accepting anything from a 'foreign State' within the Clause’s 
meaning.”
107
 Affirming previous opinions,
108
 the OLC held that, “the 
Emoluments Clause reaches not only ‘foreign State[s]’ as such but also their 
instrumentalities” and the question in defining what a foreign state is under the 
Clause is, “whether the Committee has the kind of ties to a foreign government 
that would make it, and by extension the Nobel Foundation in financing the 
Prize, an instrumentality of a foreign state under our precedents.”
109
 
The OLC opined that to be exempt from the Clause, the awarding foreign 
entity must be sufficiently independent of the foreign government of that 
entity, “specifically with respect to the conferral of the emolument or present 
at issue.”
110
  The factors that go into whether a foreign entity is independent of 
its government, which is made on a case by case determination, includes 
whether the government is the substantial source of funding, whether the 
government makes the determinative decision regarding the emolument, 
and/or whether the government has substantial control over the management 
 
102 David J. Barron, President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 370 (2009). 
 103 Id. at 371. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 373. 
 107 Id. at 4. 
 108 Walter Dellinger, Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government Members of ACUS, 
supra note 87; Walter Dellinger, Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Employment of 
Government Employees by Foreign Public Universities, supra note 94. 
 109 Barron, supra note 102 at 379. 
 110 Id. at 380. 
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of the entity.
111
  If the entity has independence from government control, 
autonomy in making decisions, and if the entity and the prize are financially 
independent from the foreign government then the entity is not a “foreign 
state”
112
 under the Emoluments clause.
113
  The OLC concluded that since the 
Nobel Foundation and the Nobel Committee were independent from 
direction of the Norwegian government both as to deliberations, decision 
making, and the prize was financially sourced and managed independently of 
the Norwegian government, President Obama was free to accept the award 
without needed congressional approval.
114
 
III. THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSES AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO 
PRESIDENT TRUMP 
The OLC has not opined on whether President Trump in holding various 
national and international hotels, golf courses, and other leisure venues and 
receiving payments from them is in violation of the emolument clauses 
because it was not asked.
115
  Subsequent to his election in 2016, three separate 
lawsuits have been filed against President Trump, based on his holdings which 
he has not divested from, asserting that his receipt of payments violates the 
emoluments clause.
116
  In Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 
(CREW) v Trump117 Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 
(CREW), “a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization founded in 2002 that works 
 
 111 Id. 
112 See Daniel L Koffsky, Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and 
Decorations Act to the Göteborg Award for Sustainable Development, 34 OLC 1, at 2 n.3 (2010). 
(opining that a government entity need not be a national government but could be a local municipality 
under a national government) 
 113 Barron, supra note 102 at 380–381. 
 114 Id. at 382–84, 86. 
115  “Historically, Presidents have complied with the Clause by either seeking and obtaining 
congressional consent prior to accepting foreign presents or Emoluments, or by requesting an 
opinion from the Executive or Legislative Branch’s advisory office as to whether the Clause applies.  
Modern Presidents, except for President Trump, have sought advice from OLC prior to accepting 
potentially covered Emoluments.”  See Blumenthal v. Trump, 373 F. Supp. 3d 191, 206 (D.D.C. 
2019) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted.)] 
116 For discussion, see Michael Foster, Landlord and Tenant: The Trump Administration’s Oversight 
of the Trump International Hotel Lease: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Public 
Bldgs., and Emergency Mgmt., H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 116th Cong. (2019);  
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSES AND THE PRESIDENCY: 
BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2019);   CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2020). 
 117 Complaint, Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash. (CREW) v. Trump, No. 17-CV-458 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 17, 2017).  A listing of all filings by CREW is on their web page 
(https://www.citizensforethics.org/lawsuit/crew-v-donald-j-trump/) 
August 2021] OLC EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE 775 
on behalf of the public to foster an ethical and accountable government and 
reduce the influence of money in politics,” filed a law suit in the District Court 
of New York asserting that without judicial action President Trump has and 
would continue to violate the foreign emoluments clause.
118
  They specifically 
asserted that, 
Defendant has committed and will commit Foreign Emoluments Clause 
violations involving at least: (a) leases held by foreign-government-owned 
entities in New York’s Trump Tower; (b) room reservations and the use of 
venues and other services and goods by foreign governments and diplomats 
at Defendant’s Washington, D.C. hotel; (c) hotel stays, property leases, and 
other business transactions tied to foreign governments at other domestic and 
international establishments owned, operated, or licensed by Defendant; (d) 
payments from foreign-government-owned broadcasters related to 
rebroadcasts and foreign versions of the television program “The Apprentice” 
and its spinoffs; and (e) property interests or other business dealings tied to 
foreign governments in numerous other countries . . . . 
 
Defendant owns and controls hundreds of businesses throughout the world, 
including hotels and other properties . . . . he owns or controls, in whole or in 
part, operating in the United States and 20 or more foreign countries . . . . 
Defendant also has several licensing agreements that provide streams of 
income that continue over time.  Through these entities and agreements, 
Defendant personally benefits from business dealings, and Defendant is and 
will be enriched by any business in which they engage with foreign 
governments and officials. 
. . . . 
Through the use of various entities, Defendant owns and controls Trump 
Tower. Among the largest tenants of Trump Tower is the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), which is owned by a foreign nation, 
China. The ICBC’s lease is set to expire during Defendant’s term as 
President. In addition, the Abu Dhabi Tourism & Culture Authority, an entity 
owned by the foreign nation of the United Arab Emirates, leases office space 
in Trump Tower . . . . 
. . . 
The Trump International Hotel Washington, D.C . . . .is located . . .  just 
blocks from the White House . . . . [F]oreign diplomats have been flocking 
to Defendant’s D.C. hotel, eager to curry favor with Defendant and afraid of 
what Defendant may think or do if they send their business elsewhere in 
Washington.  One week after the election, the hotel held a special event for 
the diplomatic community.  About 100 foreign diplomats attended; they were 
greeted with champagne, food, a tour, a raffle for overnight stays at properties 
belonging to Defendant around the world, and a sales pitch about the new 
D.C. hotel. 
 
 118 Id. at 2. 
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. . . . 
Defendant regularly receives money—and, without judicial intervention, will 
continue to receive money during his presidency—each time a foreign state, a 
foreign diplomat, some other agent of a foreign state, or some other 
instrumentality of a foreign nation stays in a room or pays for a venue or other 
service in Defendant’s D.C. hotel.
119 
The complaint proceeded to discuss similar financial ventures, both 
international and domestic, that resulted in multiple sources of financial 
payments that President Trump would receive through his multiple 
companies after assuming the office of the presidency, which CREW asserted 





 was filed on June 12, 2017 by the District of Columbia 
and the state of Maryland, District of Columbia and State of Maryland v. 
Trump, in which the plaintiffs asserted similar financial dealings by President 
Trump in which the 
defendant, his organization, and its affiliates have received presents or 
emoluments from foreign states or instrumentalities and federal 
agencies, and state and local governments in the form of payments to 
the defendant’s hotels, restaurants, and other properties. The 
defendant has used his position as President to boost this patronage of 
his enterprises, and foreign diplomats and other public officials have 
made clear that the defendant’s position as President increases the 
likelihood that they will frequent his properties and businesses.
122
 
Both D.C, and the state of Maryland asserted that they suffered injury 
because international and domestic guests will use the hotels and facilities of 
President Trump over those not owned by him to gain his favor and his 
competitors in D.C. and Maryland will suffer financial loss due to his violations 
of the foreign and domestic emoluments clauses; “the District and Maryland 
have an interest in protecting their economies and their residents, who, as the 
defendant’s local competitors, are injured by decreased business, wages, and 
tips resulting from economic and commercial activity diverted to the 
 
 119 Id. at 3, 9–10, 12–14.  
 120 Id. at 6–22.  Note that the CREW case was vacated and remanded for dismissal as moot once Trump 
left office. Trump v. Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash., 141 S.Ct. 1262, 1262 (2021). 
 121 Complaint, District of Columbia v. Trump, No. 17-CV-01596 (D. Md. June 12, 2017).  A listing of 
all the filings in this case are located at Washington D.C. Attorney General Emoluments Lawsuit web 
page https://oag.dc.gov/about-oag/emoluments-lawsuit and the Maryland Attorney General 
Emoluments Lawsuit Court Filings web page 
https://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Pages/Emoluments/Court_Filings.aspx  
 122 Id. at 5–6. 
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The third lawsuit was filed on June 14, 2017 by one hundred ninety-six 
members of Congress
124
 who sought “relief from the President’s continuing 
violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause” and asserted that his accepting 
of emoluments through his multiple businesses were in violation the Clauses 
due to his failure to abide by the power invested in the Congress which 
required the President to seek approval from Congress to receive 
emoluments.
125
  The complaint asserted, 
Defendant has chosen to accept numerous benefits from foreign states 
without first seeking or obtaining congressional approval.  Indeed, he has 
taken the position that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not require him 
to obtain such approval before accepting benefits arising out of exchanges 
between foreign states and his businesses . . . . By accepting these benefits 
from foreign states without first seeking or obtaining congressional approval, 
Defendant has thwarted the transparency that the “Consent of the Congress” 
provision was designed to provide. 
Moreover, by accepting these benefits from foreign states without first seeking 
or obtaining congressional approval, Defendant has also denied Plaintiffs the 
opportunity to give or withhold their “Consent” to his acceptance of individual 
emoluments and has injured them in their roles as members of Congress. 
To redress that injury, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief establishing that 
Defendant violates the Constitution when he accepts any monetary or 
nonmonetary benefit—any “present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind 
whatever”—from a foreign state without first obtaining “the Consent of the 
Congress.”  Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief ordering Defendant not to 
accept any such benefits from a foreign state without first obtaining “the 
Consent of the Congress.”
 126 
The third lawsuit was dismissed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (February 
7, 2020)
 127
 and the second was dismissed by a panel of the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals (July 10, 2019) for lack of standing
128
 but the Fourth Circuit granted 
 
 123 Id. at 6.  Like the CREW case, this case was vacated and remanded for dismissal following Trump’s 
departure from office. Trump v. District of Columbia, 141 S. Ct. 1262, 1262 (2021).  
 124 Complaint at 19, Blumenthal v. Trump, No 17-CV-01154 (D.D.C. June 14, 2017). A listing of all 
the filings in this case is located on the Constitutional Accountability Center web page at 
https://www.theusconstitution.org/litigation/trump-and-foreign-emoluments-clause/  
 125 Id. at 18–19. 
 126 Id. at 19. 
 127 Blumenthal v. Trump, 949 F.3d 14, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 128 The court issued two opinions holding that both in his official and individual capacities, the plaintiffs 
did not have standing and the district court was instructed to dismiss the case with prejudice.  For 
court holding regarding case against President Trump in his official capacity, see In re Trump, 928 
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an appeal for an en banc hearing which occurred on December 12, 2019.129  
On May 14, 2020 the Fourth Circuit en banc reversed the panel decision.130  
In the first lawsuit, on September 13, 2019, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing and remanded the case for further proceedings.
131
  On October 28, 
2019, President Trump filed a petition for an en banc rehearing by the Second 
Circuit.
132
  On August 17, 2020 the Second Circuit denied President Trump’s 
petition for an en banc rehearing.133 
On July 6, 2020 the plaintiffs in Richard Blumenthal, et. al. v Donald 
Trump filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court for review of the D.C. 
Court of Appeals holding dismissing the congressional lawsuit for lack of 
standing.
134
  On September 9, 2020 President Trump filed a writ of certiorari 
with the Supreme Court for review of the Second Circuit Court
135
 and the 
Fourth Circuit Court holdings that the plaintiffs had standing.
136
  On October 
13, 2020 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Richard Blumenthal, et. 
al. v. Donald Trump137 effectively ending the attempt of members of Congress 
to enforce the emoluments clause in the courts.  On January 25, 2021 the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in both the Trump v. District of Columbia 
and Trump v. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington cases with 
 
F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, No. 18-2486 (4th Cir. 2019) and for holding regarding case 
in his individual capacity, see In re Trump, No. 18-2488 (4th Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, No. 18-2486 
(4th Cir. 2019). 
 129 In re Trump, No. 18-2488 (4th Cir. 2019).  
 130 The en banc Court issued two opinions. In regard to President Trump’s official capacity, see In re 
Trump, 958 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing and instructing 
the district court to dismiss the case with prejudice). In regard to President Trump’s individual 
capacity, see Dist. of Columbia v. Trump, 959 F.3d 126, 132 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that because 
“the district court did not deny the President’s immunity claim, [they] did not have jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal”).  
 131 Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash. (CREW) v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131, 160 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 132 Defendant’s Petition for Rehearing en banc at 1–2, Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash. (CREW) 
v. Trump, No. 18-474 (2d Cir. October 28, 2019), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/storage.citizensforethics.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/03160150/2019-10-28-204-DOJ-Pet.-for-Rehg-En-Banc.pdf.   
 133 Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash. (CREW) v. Trump, 971 F.3d 102, 102 (2nd Cir. 2020). 
 134 Elizabeth Wydra, et al., Blumenthal, et al. v. Trump, CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
CENTER, https://www.theusconstitution.org/litigation/trump-and-foreign-emoluments-clause/.  
 135 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Trump v. Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash., (No. 20-330) 
(Sept. 9, 2020) (“Whether plaintiffs who claim to compete with businesses in which the President of 
the United States has a financial interest can seek redress in an Article III court to enforce the Foreign 
and Domestic Emoluments Clauses of the U.S. Constitution against the President.”). 
 136 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Trump v. Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash., (No. 20-330) 
(Sept. 9, 2020) (“Mandamus Is Appropriate to Correct the District Court’s Clear and Indisputable 
Legal Errors in Declining to Dismiss Respondents’ Suit[.]”). 
 137 Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 20-5, cert. denied, (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020). 
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orders that the judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second and Fourth Circuit were vacated and the cases remanded with 
directions to dismiss the cases as moot
138
 affirming the arguments submitted by 
District of Columbia and CREWS that the petitions of certiorari should not 
be granted due to the fact that Donald Trump lost the November 2020 
presidential election and would not be president on January 20, 2021.
139
  
Although the question of whether the plaintiffs had standing to enforce the 
emoluments clause was not finally settled by the Supreme Court, in two of the 
three cases standing was affirmed,
140
 and two courts had formally held that the 




138 See Supreme Court Orders, at 2 (January 25, 2021), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/012521zor_3f14.pdf.  
139  See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Petition of Certiorari at 6, 8, Trump v. Citizens for Resp. 
and Ethics in Wash., (No-20-330) (“[T]he case will become moot on January 20, 2021, when 
President-Elect Biden is inaugurated as President. . . .  That alone is reason to deny the petition. . .  .  
Because there is no reasonable expectation that this ‘same controversy’ will persist once President 
Trump leaves office, the government’s petition here amounts to a request for an advisory opinion on 
the standing of plaintiffs to bring Emoluments Clause challenges to future presidents.”); Brief in 
Opposition to Petition of Certiorari at 27, Trump v. District of Columbia, (20-331) (“This case arises 
from Donald Trump’s decision to retain ownership  of the  Trump  Organization while holding the 
Office of President.  Based on the certified election results, however, President-Elect Joseph R. 
Biden, Jr. will be inaugurated as the 46th President of the United States on January 20, 2021.  The 
moment that occurs . . . [t]he case will be moot.”) 
140  On December 21, 2017, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that CREW 
did not have standing to sue President Trump to enforce the Emoluments clause.  On September 
13, 2019 the Second Circuit reversed. See Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Gov’t v. Trump, 939 F.3d 
131, 141–42 (2nd Cir. 2019).  
 On September 28, 2018, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that the members of 
congress had standing to sue President Trump for violations of the Emoluments clause. See 
Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 51 (D.D.C. 2018).  
 On March 28, 2018, the District Court for the District of Columbia found that the District of 
Columbia and the State of Maryland had standing, see Dist. of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 
725, 732 (D. Md. 2018).  On July 25, 2018, the district court held on the merits:  
that Plaintiffs have convincingly argued that the term "emolument" in both the 
Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses, with slight refinements that the Court 
will address, means any "profit," "gain," or "advantage" and that accordingly they have 
stated claims to the effect that the President, in certain instances, has violated both 
the Foreign and Domestic Clauses.  The Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss in 
that respect. 
See District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 878 (D. Md. 2018).  
141  District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 878 (D. Md. 2018) and Blumenthal v. Trump, 
335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018).  The District of Columbia District Court held regarding the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause: 
The language of the Emoluments Clause is both sweeping and unqualified. The 
acceptance of an emolument barred by the Clause is prohibited unless Congress 
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Leaving the question of standing aside,
142
 I propose to look at the various 
complaints from the perspective of OLC jurisprudence on the emoluments 
 
chooses to permit an exception.  The Constitution of the United States has left with 
Congress the exclusive authority to permit the acceptance of presents from foreign 
Governments by persons holding Offices under the United States.  And the 
President may not accept any emolument until Congress votes to give its consent. 
The Clause was intended by the Framers to guard against corruption and foreign 
influence.  Historically, Presidents have complied with the Clause by either seeking 
and obtaining congressional consent prior to accepting foreign presents or 
emoluments, or by requesting an opinion from the Executive or Legislative Branch's 
advisory office as to whether the Clause applies. 
Modern Presidents, except for President Trump, have sought advice from the 
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") prior to accepting potentially 
covered emoluments.  For example, President Kennedy requested an opinion on 
whether the offer of an “honorary Irish citizenship” would fall within the scope of 
the Clause.  And prior to his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009, President 
Obama requested an opinion from OLC as to whether accepting the prize would 
conflict with the Clause. 
Since the Clause prohibits the President from accepting a prohibited foreign 
emolument unless Congress votes to consent, the Constitution gives each individual 
Member of Congress a right to vote before the President accepts.  That Congress 
acts as "the body as a whole" in providing or denying consent does not alter each 
Member's constitutional right to vote before the President accepts a prohibited 
foreign emolument because the body can give its consent only through a majority 
vote of its individual members. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs have standing to sue the President for 
allegedly violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 
Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 53–54, 72 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  
 142 In defending the Second Circuit panel opinion and the denial of en banc review, Judge Leval asserted 
that plaintiffs’ economic competitor injury claim established standing under Article III. Supra note 
133, Judge Leval, Statement in Support of the Denial of En Banc Rehearing at 128, 129, 131–32, 
138. 
   Judge Leval’s opinion was in line with OLC jurisprudence regarding the appearance of or actual 
conflict of interest and possibility of corruption.  Judge Leval argued that the plaintiff’s argument that 
they suffered economic injury was logical because the nature of Trump’s position as chief of 
American foreign policy and as President, both provide an incentive for diplomats (foreign 
emoluments clause) and states (domestic emoluments clause) to choose his hotels and restaurants 
over others in Washington D.C. to curry favor with him due to his position in the government and 
policy made by the government. Id. at 130–32.  “What is involved in the plaintiffs’ allegations is an 
advantage (derived by the defendant from allegedly illegal conduct) that will be clearly perceptible to 
governmental customers, and will provide them with a strong incentive to patronize the President’s 
establishments in preference to the plaintiffs’.” Id. at 136. Which is precisely what the foreign and 
domestic emoluments clauses are designed to prevent, see supra part II. 
   As to the emoluments clause itself regarding standing, Judge Leval asserted, while it is true, “a 
violation of the Emoluments Clauses does not, by itself, confer standing” the plaintiffs establish 
standing because they make an “entirely plausible allegation that, as a result of the President’s 
conduct, their businesses will suffer a direct and particularized economic injury” because the 
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clauses and determine what the OLC would have concluded regarding the 
applicability of the foreign and domestic emoluments clauses to President 
Trump and his domestic and international businesses which produce income 
to him. 
President Trump did not seek an OLC opinion on his finances, but if the 
OLC were presented with a question from the White House as to whether 
President Trump was in violation of the domestic emolument or foreign 
emolument clauses it would, according to past opinions, have made the 
following inquiries: 
1. Whether the president is a “Person holding any Office of Profit or 
Trust under [the United States].” 
2. Whether profits, fees, or payments from his hotels or other financial 
business patronized by foreign diplomats or governments are 
“Emolument[s]  . . . from any King, Prince, or foreign State.” 
3. Whether profits, fees, or payments from his hotels of other business 
patronized by officials from various states within the United States is receiving 
“any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.” 
Taking as a given that question one is answered in the affirmative, if either 
or both questions two and three are answered in the affirmative the OLC 
would have advised that the president would be in violation of the foreign 
and/or domestic emoluments clauses and could not accept such emoluments.  
For the purposes of this exercise, it will be assumed as true the assertions made 
in the three lawsuit complaints regarding the income and business practices of 
President Trump and his domestic and international businesses. 
Questions one and two: The foreign emoluments clause.  The OLC 
opined in 1982 that the threshold question presented in a foreign emoluments 
clause inquiry is whether the person is holding an office of Profit or trust and 
concluded that a person holding a supervisory capacity or a person who 
holding a position under the Appointment Clause is a person who holds an 
office under the United States and thus is holding an office of profit or trust.
143
  
The OLC assumed without discussion that the foreign emolument clause 
applied to the president in both the 1963 Irish Citizenship opinion and the 
1981 Retirement Benefits opinions. In the 2009 Nobel Prize opinion the 
assumption that the president holds an office of profit or trust was affirmed 
 
President’s conduct “harm to a plaintiff’s competitive position in the marketplace is precisely the type 
of palpable economic injury that has long been recognized as sufficient to lay the basis for standing.” 
Id. at 143 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 143 Robert B. Shanks, Application of the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution and the Foreign Gifts 
and Decorations Act, 6 Op. O.L.C. 156, 157 (1982).  
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holding that, “[t]he President surely holds an Office of Profit or Trust.”
144
  This 
presumption is based on prior opinions that defined the office of profit or trust 
by the nature of office in question and its function and authority defined by 
factors including whether the office is a constitutional office above offices filled 
through the appointments clause, whether the office has supervisory authority 
over the formation and/or implementation of government policy, whether the 
position carries law enforcement responsibilities and powers of the nation, 
whether the position requires an oath, whether the position requires security 
clearances,  and whether the position carries a demand for a high level of 
loyalty to the United States.
145
  In a 1988 opinion on the nature of federal law 
enforcement agents in relation to the emoluments clause the OLC concluded, 
 
144    Barron, supra note 82, at 374. 
 145 See generally Karl R. Thompson, Special Government Employee Serving as Paid Consultant to 
Saudi Company, 40 op OLC 1 (2016) ("office of Profit or trust" under the Foreign Emoluments 
clause is defined in two different ways, either as any office covered by the Appointments Clause or 
an office covered by the multi-factor test designed to apply to an employee subject possible foreign 
corruption); Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government members of  ACUS (II), 
34 Op. O.L.C. 181 (2010);  Charles J Cooper, Application of Emoluments Clause to Part-Time 
Consultant for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission supra note 35 (“Rather, under the Emoluments 
Clause, the inquiry is whether [the] position . . . could be characterized as one of profit or trust 
under the United States—a position requiring undivided loyalty to the United States government.”); 
John O. McGinnis, Authority of Foreign Law Enforcement Agents to Carry Weapons in the United 
States supra note 35 (“The Emoluments Clause must be read broadly in order to fulfill that purpose. 
Accordingly, the Clause applies to all persons holding an office of profit or trust under the United 
States, and not merely to that smaller group of persons who are deemed to be ‘officers of the United 
States’ for purposes of Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.”); Walter Dellinger, The Advisory 
Committee on International Economic Policy, 20 Op. O.L.C. 123 (1996) (finding that sitting on the 
advisory committee was not holding an office of profit or trust because the position met “only 
occasionally, serve without compensation, take no oath, and do not have access to classified 
information; furthermore, the Committee is purely advisory, is not a creature of statute, and 
discharges no substantive statutory responsibilities.”); Christopher H. Schroeder, The 
Constitutionality of Cooperative International Law Enforcement Activities Under the Emoluments 
Clause, 20 Op. O.L.C. 346, 349-350 (1996); (“the ordinary meaning of the term “office” does not 
include assignments of duties to persons who hold no positions in the government. In interpreting 
the term even outside the context of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has stated that an office is 
a public station conferred by the appointment of government and that the term embraces the idea of 
tenure, duration, emolument and duties fixed by law.”)(internal citation and quotation omitted); 
Richard L Shiffrin, Application of Emoluments Clause to “Representative” Members of Advisory 
Committees, 21 Op. O.L.C. 176 (1997) (A person holds an office of profit or trust when that person 
is a servant of the government.); John P. Elwood, Application of the Emoluments Clause to a 
Member of the FBI Director’s Advisory Board, 31 O.L.C. 154, 156 (2007) (“an indispensable 
element of a public ‘office’ is the exercise of some portion of delegated sovereign authority . . .  
sovereign authority as power lawfully conferred by the Government to bind third parties, or the 
Government itself, for the public benefit . . . .  Such authority primarily involves the authority to 
administer, execute, or interpret the law . . . .  To be an ‘office,’ a position must at least involve some 
exercise of governmental authority . . . .”) (internal citation omitted); and supra note 84. 
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As a matter of general principle, anyone exercising law enforcement powers 
on behalf of the United States must be viewed as holding an office of trust 
under the Emoluments Clause. Federal law enforcement agents, by the nature 
of their office, are frequently granted an array of powers that are denied to the 
private citizen; in turn, citizens look to such officers to perform a host of 
dangerous but necessary tasks to the best of their ability and with undivided 
loyalty to the United States. 
These same characteristics of office—the reposing of trust, the importance of 
the task performed by those who hold the office, the necessity for undivided 
loyalty—have been cited in other contexts in support of a determination that 
an office is an “office of profit or trust” under the United States for purposes 
of the Emoluments Clause.  Moreover, as the text of the Emoluments Clause 
suggests, one can hold an “office of trust” for purposes of the Emoluments 
Clause even if the office entails no compensation. 15 Op. Att’y Gen. 187, 188 
(1877) (members of Centennial Commission who receive no compensation 
may nonetheless hold “offices of trust” under the Emoluments Clause).  
Accordingly, those who possess federal law enforcement powers, whether 
paid or unpaid, hold offices of trust under the United States.
146 
Clearly if a federal law enforcement officer with the power and duty to 
enforce federal law is a holder of an office or profit or trust under the 
emolument clause, surely the president as the constitutional officer who is 
constitutionally the chief law enforcement officer of the United States (“shall 
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”)
147
 holds an office applicable to 
the emoluments clause. 
In 2005 the OLC issued an opinion, Application of the Emoluments 
Clause to a Member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, which provided 
 
 146 Supra note 35, at 69. The OLC rejected the broad scope of this opinion in Christopher H. 
Schroeder, The Constitutionality of Cooperative International Law Enforcement Activities Under 
the Emoluments Clause, 20 O.L.C. 346, 349 (1996), which focused on cooperative agreements 
between U.S. and United Kingdom law enforcement jointly enforcing anti-drug laws in the Caribbean 
and finding that allowing United Kingdom law enforcement to function within U.S. waters did not 
violate the emoluments clause when they jointly enforced federal law.  Thus the “reject[ing] this 
sweeping and unqualified view” was attached to “extending the Emoluments Clause to persons having 
no position or employment in the United States Government.” Id.  Clearly the President of the 
United States has a position or employment in the United States government.  The OLC rejection 
of the 1988 opinion in the 1996 opinion was limited to its reach to foreign law enforcement in 
cooperation with U.S. Law enforcement and the rejection of the broad assertion that members of 
advisory boards are holders of an office of Profit or Trust. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.  
But the 1996 OLC opinion did not reject the framework in defining an office of profit or trust which 
includes holding law enforcement powers and powers that are not provided to private citizens and 
powers that require a level of loyalty of the office holder. 
 147 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 and U.S. CONST. art. VI (requiring the 
president to swear an oath to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States” 
which is the “the supreme Law of the Land.”).  
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a direct and formal analysis on the definition of the office of Profit or Trust 
under the United States,
148
 and determined,  
[W]e have consistently concluded that a purely advisory position is neither a 
“civil Office under the Authority of the United States” nor an “Office under 
the United States,” because it is not an “office” at all.  To be an “office,” a 
position must at least involve some exercise of governmental authority, and 
an advisory position does not.
149
 
. . . . 
The legal definitions of a public office have been many and various.  The idea 
seems to prevail that it is an employment to exercise some delegated part of 
the sovereign power; and the Supreme Court appears to attach importance to 
the ideas of ‘tenure, duration, emolument, and duties,’ and suggests that the 
last should be continuing or permanent, not occasional or temporary.
150
 
.  .  . . 
Finally, the uncontradicted weight of judicial authority confirms that a purely 
advisory position is not a public “office.”  These authorities list several factors 
relevant to determining whether a position amounts to a public “office,” 
including whether it involves the delegation of sovereign functions, whether it 
is created by law . . . , whether its occupant is required to take an oath, 
whether a salary or fee is attached, whether its duties are continuing and 
permanent, the tenure of its occupant, and the method of appointment.  But 
they likewise make clear that the sine qua non of a public “office” is the 
exercise of some portion of delegated sovereign authority.
151
 
.  .  . . 
[A]n individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of 
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.  The 
individual so invested is a public officer.  . . .  The most important 
characteristic . . .  the creation and conferring of an office involves a 
delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, 
to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
152
 
.  .  . . 
[W]e have not found a single case in which an individual was deemed to hold 
such an “office,” including one “of profit or trust,” where he was invested with 
no delegated sovereign authority, significant or otherwise.
153 
 
 148 Noel J. Francisco, Application of the Emoluments Clause to a Member of the President’s Council 
on Bioethics, 29 Op. O.L.C. 55 (2005). 
 149 Id. at 64. 
 150 Id. at 65 (citations omitted). 
 151 Id. at 66–67 (citations omitted).  
 152 Id. at 68.  
 153 Id. at 69. 
August 2021] OLC EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE 785 
It is without a doubt that the President of the United States holds an office 
of sovereign authority which is “delegated and possessed . . . belonging . . . to 
one of the three great departments”
154
 in the American government. 
Having determined that President Trump holds an office of Profit or Trust 
under the United States, the remaining question would be (1) whether the 
payments he is receiving through business interactions in his hotels are 
emoluments and (2) whether the payments are from “foreign State” which are 
prohibited without congressional approval. 
As previously discussed, the OLC has opined that any payment or present 
(gift or reward) that can be given, withheld, and/or has been is earned for 
actions or services provided is emolument.
155
 But under the foreign 
emoluments clause, the emolument must be received from a foreign state or 
its instrumentality.
156
  The plaintiffs in the Blumenthal, CREW, and District of 
Columbia lawsuits asserted that President Trump was gaining earned 
payments through his commercial enterprises both domestic and 
international. President Trump did not dispute the income by these 
enterprises.
157
  He asserted to the contrary that these earned payments, like 
those earned by previous presidents, were never covered by the emoluments 
clause.
158
  President Trump asserted that the framers, “gave no indication that 
they intended to require officeholders to divest their private commercial 
businesses in order to assume federal office.  And yet, it was common at the 




 154 Id. at 68. 
 155 See Barron supra note 102 (discussing emolument). See also supra notes 34–35 (discussing 
emolument).  
 156 See Koffsky supra note 112 (discussing emolument). See also supra notes 34–35 (discussing 
emolument).  
 157 See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 41, District of Columbia v. 
Trump, 17-1596 (D. Md.) (Sept. 29, 2017) (“[T]he Emoluments Clauses were not designed to reach 
commercial transactions that a President (or other federal official) may engage in as an ordinary 
citizen through his business enterprises.  At the time of the Nation’s founding, government officials 
were not given generous compensations, and many federal officials were employed with the 
understanding that they would continue to have income from private pursuits . . . .  Presidents who 
were plantation owners similarly continued their agriculture businesses, exporting cash crops 
overseas.”).  
 158 See id. at 45 (“For over two centuries, the Emoluments Clauses have been interpreted and applied 
in an office- and employment-specific manner, without infringing on the ability of Presidents or other 
officeholders to have private business interests, when there is no indication that the official is using 
such businesses as a conduit to receive compensation for service to a foreign government in an official 
capacity or in an employment-like capacity.  In line with its drafting history, the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause was invoked most often, for the several decades following its adoption, in the context of 
foreign-government gifts tendered to U.S. diplomats or officials.”). 
 159 Id. at 51. 
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jurisprudence retorts that the defining of the range and meaning of 
emoluments is based on its purpose which is to avoid the possibility of 
corruption of any holder of an office of profit or trust and such holder must 
be shielded from the corrupting influence of outside emoluments.  The search 
and pursuit of business profits while holding an office of trust under the United 
Sates by definition is a corrupting influence. 
Having concluded that outside business ventures and profits secured by 
them are emoluments, OLC jurisprudence would focus on the source of these 
emoluments—whether they originated from a “foreign state” or its 
instrumentality.  President Trump provided no denial that his international 
ventures included clients that were government agencies or instrumentalities. 
Diplomats were engaged to use his hotels and golf courses and other business 
entities. The OLC would conclude that the “foreign state” or its 
instrumentality requirement was met. 
Thus, if asked
160
 and if the OLC affirmed its jurisprudence, the OLC would 
advise the White House that the President Trump would be in violation of 
the foreign emoluments clause if he received payments, fees, profits from 
business ventures with foreign governments through his national and 
international businesses without approval from Congress.
161
  The OLC would 
conclude that the purpose of the clause was to prevent corruption and the 
possibility of corruption and that broader purpose defines the meaning of the 
 
 160 The president did not request an OLC opinion regarding his actions which is break from executive 
branch tradition.  Presidents Kennedy, Reagan and Obama all sought OLC opinions regarding 
possible emoluments clause concerns, as the D.C. District Court observed in Blumenthal v. Trump, 
373 F. Supp. 3d 191, 206 (D.D.C. 2019).  The D.C. court, as the Maryland court does, affirms the 
test (totality of the circumstances) and conclusions of the OLC regarding the definition and 
application of the emoluments clause. Id.  “OLC opinions have consistently cited the broad purpose 
of the Clause and broad understanding of “Emolument” advocated by plaintiffs to guard against even 
the potential for improper foreign government influence.” Id.  “Accordingly, adopting the President’s 
narrow definition of “Emolument” would be entirely inconsistent with Executive Branch practice 
defining “Emolument” and determining whether the Clause applies.” Id. 
 161 The Maryland court came to the same conclusion regarding the emoluments clause. See District of 
Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 899 (D. Md. 2018) (“[S]ole or substantial ownership of a 
business that receives hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars a year in revenue from one of its 
hotel properties where foreign and domestic governments are known to stay (often with the express 
purpose of cultivating the President’s good graces) most definitely raises the potential for undue 
influence, and would be well within the contemplation of the Clauses.”). 
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foreign emoluments clause.
162
  The OLC would conclude that the emoluments 
clause is not voluntary but constitutionally required.
163
 
Question three—the domestic emoluments clause.  The domestic 
emoluments clause prohibits the president from receiving “any other 
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.”
164
  In the Reagan 
Retirement Benefits opinion the OLC concluded that the domestic 
emolument clause was implicated because President Reagan was receiving 
payments from a state government, but the clause did not prohibit the 
president from receiving the retirement payments because they were not 
 
 162 See id. at 900 for the court affirming this approach to defining emoluments: 
The Court is satisfied, consistent with the text and the original public meaning of the term 
“emolument,” that the historical record reflects that the Framers were acutely aware of and 
concerned about the potential for foreign or domestic influence of any sort over the 
President.  An “emolument” within the meaning of the Emoluments Clauses was intended 
to reach beyond simple payment for services rendered by a federal official in his official 
capacity, which in effect would merely restate a prohibition against bribery.  The term was 
intended to embrace and ban anything more than de minimis profit, gain, or advantage 
offered to a public official in his private capacity as well, wholly apart from his official salary. 
  The court proceeded to affirm OLC jurisprudence directly: “OLC pronouncements repeatedly cite 
the broad purpose of the Clauses and the expansive reach of the term ‘emolument.’” Id. at 901.  
“The main takeaway from executive precedent stands in bold relief: The Emoluments Clauses are 
intended to protect against any type of potentially improper influence by foreign, the federal, and 
state governments upon the President.” Id. at 902.  The court also discussed the Reagan retirements 
opinion, stating “profits received from foreign or domestic governments that patronize the Trump 
International Hotel for the express purpose of potentially currying favor with a sitting President 
present a stark contrast to the fully vested retirement benefits that then-Governor Reagan earned 
from the State of California which the State of California was not free to withdraw.” Id. at 903.  The 
court correctly observed the distinction between profits secured through business—prohibited by the 
emoluments clause—and payments by right (retirement pension) that could not be withdrawn 
increased or decreased by the state of California—which are not emoluments. 
 163 The D.C. Court in Blumenthal v. Trump, came to the same conclusion.  Citing the OLC, the court 
concluded that: 
“The language of the Emoluments Clause is both sweeping and unqualified.”  The 
acceptance of an Emolument barred by the Clause is prohibited unless Congress chooses 
to permit an exception.  Given the “sweeping and unqualified” Constitutional mandate, the 
President has “no discretion . . . no authority to determine whether to perform the duty” 
to not accept any Emolument until Congress gives its consent.  Accordingly, seeking 
congressional consent prior to accepting prohibited foreign emoluments is a ministerial 
duty. . . . The President complains about the “significant burdens” an injunction requiring 
him to comply with the Clause would impose.  However . . . the correct inquiry is not 
whether injunctive relief requiring the President to comply with the Constitution would 
burden him, but rather whether allowing this case to go forward would interfere with his 
ability to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed . . . .  Accordingly, the injunctive relief 
sought in this case is constitutional. 
  Blumenthal v. Trump, 373 F. Supp. 3d 191, 212 (D.D.C. 2019), vacated as moot, 949 F.3d 14 (D.C. 
Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). 
164    U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
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subject to the state changing or in any way affecting his receipt of them.
165
  
Although it is clearly established that the clause applies to fees, payments, 
profits
166
 from states and their instrumentalities or from the United States it 
does not apply to such emoluments from private parties.
167
 The OLC 
concluded in the Nobel Prize168 and in the Goteborg Award169 opinions that the 
 
 165 Simms, supra note 73. 
 166 District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 898. (“Where, for example, a President maintains 
a premier hotel property that generates millions of dollars a year in profits, how likely is it that he will 
not be swayed, whether consciously or subconsciously, in any or all of his dealings with foreign or 
domestic governments that might choose to spend large sums of money at that hotel property?  How, 
indeed, could it ever be proven, in a given case, that he had actually been influenced by the payments?  
The Framers of the Clauses made it simple.  Ban the offerings altogether (unless, in the foreign 
context at least, Congress sees fit to approve them).”). 
 167 See id. at 899 (“In any event, it must be remembered that the Emoluments Clauses only prohibit 
profiting from transactions with foreign, the federal, or domestic governments; they do not prohibit 
all private foreign or domestic transactions on the part of a federal official.”).  The court concluded, 
Executive branch precedent and practice have clearly and consistently held, apart from de 
minimis instances, that both Emoluments Clauses prohibit Presidents from receiving any 
profit, gain, or advantage from foreign, the federal, or domestic governments, except in the 
case of the Foreign Clause, where Congress approves.  Based on precedent from the OLC 
and Comptroller General, there would be an exception, at least under the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause, where the thing of value received by the federal office holder, after the 
fashion of the Reagan-California pension precedent, was fully vested and indefeasible before 
the federal official became a federal official, the rationale being that the benefit would lack 
any potential to influence the federal office-holder in his decision-making. 
  Id. at 904. 
  The D.C. District Court came to the same conclusion utilizing the similar reasoning in Richard 
Blumenthal v. Donald Trump.  Citing Judge Messitte’s opinion a year earlier, the court concluded 
that, “defining an ‘Emolument’ as a ‘profit,’ ‘gain,’ or ‘advantage’ ‘ensure[s] that the Clause covered 
all types of financial transactions—solicited or unsolicited, reciprocated or unreciprocated, official or 
private’—even if ‘Emolument’ is sometimes used synonymously with ‘present.’” Blumenthal v. 
Trump, 373 F. Supp. 3d at 201.  “Finally, there is no question that the receipt of Emoluments is tied 
to the office of President and regulating his conduct as President . . . .” Id. at 202. 
 168 Barron, supra note 102, at 380 (“To determine whether a particular case involves receipt of a present 
or emolument from a foreign state, however, our Office has closely examined the particular facts at 
hand.  Specifically, we have sought to determine from those facts whether the entity in question is 
sufficiently independent of the foreign government to which it is arguably tied—specifically with 
respect to the conferral of the emolument or present . . . that its actions cannot be deemed to be 
those of that foreign state.  In  short,  our  opinions  reflect  a  consistent  focus  on  whether an 
entity’s decision to confer a particular present or emolument is subject to governmental control or 
influence.”) 
 169 Daniel L. Koffsky, NOAA Employee’s Receipt of the Göteborg Award for Sustainable 
Development, 34 Op. O.L.C. 210, 212–213 (“In our view, the Emoluments Clause does not apply 
to the NOAA scientist’s acceptance of the Göteborg Award because that prize would not be tendered 
by a “foreign State” within the Clause’s meaning.  That view does not rest on the notion that the City 
of Göteborg is not a “foreign State” under the Emoluments Clause, but rather on the conclusion, 
based on the representations you have made, that the City does not appear to control the granting of 
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critical question regarding the emolument was the status of the source of the 
emolument and if that source is private—nongovernmental—the person 
holding the office of profit or trust can accept the emolument without 
congressional approval.  The domestic emoluments clause uses the same 
limiting scope, and the OLC would conclude “the United States, or any of 
them” means any state or local government entity and that President Trump 
would not be in violation of the domestic emolument clause when he receives 
payments from private nongovernmental entities.  He would be in such 
violation if he received any emolument from a U.S. government agency or any 




In 1903 President Theodore Roosevelt asserted the following in his third 
address to Congress, 
Under our form of government all authority is vested in the people and by 
them delegated to those who represent them in official capacity.  There can 
be no offense heavier than that of him in whom such a sacred trust has been 
reposed, who sells it for his own gain and enrichment. . . . The exposure and 
punishment of public corruption is an honor to a nation, not a disgrace. The 
shame lies in toleration, not in correction . . . . If we fail to do all that in us lies 
to stamp out corruption we can not escape our share of responsibility for the 
guilt. The first requisite of successful self-government is unflinching 
enforcement of the law and the cutting out of corruption.
171
 
As discussed in this article, the OLC and the Attorney General before 
them, have asserted that the goal and purpose of the emoluments clauses is to 
prevent not only government corruption, but the possibility of it occurring by 
preventing any officer from accepting any payment, fee, or emolument from 
any government entity; foreign or domestic. The President is obliged to 




the Göteborg Award.  Rather, the selection of the award recipients appears to be made by the 
Göteborg Award Association,  acting  through  a  jury  appointed  by  the  Board  of  the  Association.  
The relevant question here is whether the decision to grant the award to a particular individual by the 
jury appointed by the Board of the Association is sufficiently independent of the government of the 
City of Göteborg that conferral of the award should not be deemed an action of a foreign state for 
the purposes of the Emoluments Clause.”).  
 170 Id. See also supra note 102 (arguing that President Obama is not violating the Emoluments Clause 
by receiving the Nobel Peace Prize “because the Norwegian Nobel Committee is not a ‘King, Prince, 
or foreign State”); Shanks, supra note 143, at 158 (“Congress has consented only to the receipt of 
minimal gifts from any foreign state . . . . Therefore, any other emolument stand forbidden . . . .”). 
 171 President Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 7, 1903). 
172    See supra notes 169, 171. See infra note 173. 
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Presidents are not kings and all officers under the Constitution—the 
president included—are required to comply with its texts and the laws passed 
under its authority.
173
  As the Supreme Court has recently ruled in a different 
context regarding the standing of the president under the requirements of the 
law,  
In our judicial system, the public has a right to every man’s evidence.  Since 
the earliest days of the Republic, every man has included the President of the 
United States. Beginning with Jefferson and carrying on through Clinton 
[there is a] 200-year history of Presidents being subject to federal judicial 
process [and] presidential immunity does not bar the enforcement of a state 
grand jury subpoena . . . even when the subject matter under investigation 
pertains to the President.
174
 
This 200-year history includes past presidents and their rhetorical defense 
of the rule of law, as Theodore Roosevelt made clear in his third annual 
address at the turn of the twentieth century: “No man is above the law and no 
man is below it; nor do we ask any man’s permission when we require him to 
obey it.  Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a favor.”175 
This truism has been long advocated by the courts as well as by past 
presidents dating back to the founding generation; as John Adams explained 
in 1776 before the drafting of the Constitution. 
The dignity and stability of government in all its branches, the morals of the 
people and every blessing of society, depends so much upon an upright and 
skillful administration of justice, that the judicial power ought to be distinct 
from both the legislative and executive, and independent upon both, that so it 
may be a check upon both, as both should be checks upon that.
176
 
In defense of this truism that acts required of the president under the law 
are not subject to discretion in obedience, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
went out of its way to correct the error in the advocacy of President Trump 
making clear that the President was not a King and that his powers as president 
were limited under the law. 
 
 173 For discussion on the rule of law as applied to executive power, see generally Arthur H. Garrison, 
The Traditions and History of the Meaning of the Rule of Law, 12 GEO. J.L. PUB. POL’Y  565, 565 
(2014) (noting that “the arbitrary use of executive power is condemned”); Arthur H. Garrison, The 
Rule of Law and the Rise of Control of Executive Power, 18 TEX. REV. L. POL. 303, 304 (2014) 
(discussing the notion “that executive power can and should be controlled”). 
 174 Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2420–2421 (2020).  The Court concluded that “ . . . entrenched 
by 200 years of practice . . . confirms that federal criminal subpoenas do not ‘rise to the level of 
constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive’s ability to perform its constitutionally 
mandated functions.’” Id. at 2425. 
 175 President Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 7, 1903). 
 176 John Adams, Thoughts on Government (1776), https://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/v1ch4s5.html. 
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Although the Constitution entrusts the President with the enormous 
responsibility of faithfully executing the law, see U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, cl. 5, 
the notion that the President is vested with unreviewable power to both 
execute and interpret the law is foreign to our system of government. The 
Framers, concerned about the corrosive effect of power and animated by fears 
of unduly blending government powers, dispersed the authority to enforce the 
law and the authority to interpret it.  To hold otherwise would mean that the 
President alone has the ultimate authority to interpret what the Constitution 
means.  Allowing the President to be the final arbiter of both the interpretation 
and enforcement of the law—as the dissents would—would gravely offend 
separation of powers.  Rather than sanction an “assault by the judicial branch 
against the powers of the executive,” first dissent at 27, our holding affirms the 
separation of powers principles dictated by the Constitution and endorsed by 
centuries of foundational jurisprudence.
177
 
Although courts and presidential practice and tradition as well as the letter 
of the law all have a role in defending the principle that no man is above the 
law and all are subject to it; this maxim must also be defended by the people 
themselves; as James Garfield warned during the centennial celebration of the 
writing of the Declaration of Independence
178
 before he was elected president. 
[T]he people are responsible for the character of their [Government]. . . . If 
it be intelligent, brave, and pure, it is because the people demand those high 
qualities. . . . 
The most alarming feature of our situation is the fact that so many citizens . . . 
allow the less intelligent and the more selfish and corrupt members of the 
community to make the slates and “run the machine” of politics.  They wait 
until the machine has done its work, and then, in surprise and horror at the 
ignorance and corruption in public office, sigh for the return of that mythical 
period called the “better and purer days of the republic.”  It is precisely this 
neglect of the first steps in our political processes that has made possible the 
worst evils of our system. 
The Supreme Court held in Trump v. Vance that all presidents, from 
Jefferson through Clinton and now Trump, are subject to the dictates of the 
law and it was in defense of this principle that regarding the restraints placed 
on presidential enrichment under the Emoluments Clauses, the en banc 
Fourth Circuit court wrote, 
Such restraints are positive law, and of course the President must comply with 
the law.  The duty to do so, however, is not a uniquely official executive duty 
of the President, for in the United States, every person—even the President—
has a duty to obey the law.  The duty to obey these particular laws—the 
Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses—flows from the President’s status as head 
 
 177 In re Trump, 958 F.3d 274, 288–289 (4th Cir. 2020), vacated, 141 S.Ct 1262 (2021). 
 178 James A. Garfield, A Century of Congress, (July 4, 1876), reprinted in THE ATLANTIC (April 1877), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1877/04/a-century-of-congress/519708/. 
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of the Executive Branch, but this duty to obey neither constitutes an official 
executive prerogative nor impedes any official executive function. 
Moreover, even if obeying the law were somehow an official executive duty, 
such a duty would not be “discretionary,” but rather a “ministerial” act.
179 
President Trump has sought to escape the application of the emoluments 
clauses by disputing the standing of the parties seeking their enforcement.  As 
discussed previously, the Fourth and Second circuit courts had cleared the way 
for review of the cases on the merits of the meaning the emoluments clauses 
and their applicability to the financial actions of President Trump. The whole 
question became moot when President Trump lost his reelection in 
November 2020.  
This article has asserted that if the OLC had been consulted, it would rule 
that the clauses apply to financial activities of President Trump and his 
accepting of payments from foreign governments for the use of his facilities is 
a foreign emolument and payments by the federal government or states for 
use of his facilities is a domestic emolument.  The purpose of the payments in 
not the concern of the clauses, it is the receipt of enrichment and the threat or 
perception of corruption that is the point.  As President Roosevelt made clear, 
“Every man must be guaranteed his liberty and his right to do as he likes with 
his property or his labor, so long as he does not infringe the rights of others.”
180
  
But as president, the holder of the office must hold fidelity to the constitution 
and the laws and the traditions of the office
181
 that govern actions while in that 
office even when they infringe on the holder’s rights as businessman.  As the 
en banc Fourth Circuit made clear regarding the purpose and applicability of 
the emoluments clauses of the Constitution, such 
[C]onstitutional dictates, like the Emoluments Clauses, do not vest the 
President with any duty to execute the law.  They are, rather, restraints on the 
President.  Indeed, as the dissenters acknowledge, the Founders themselves 
recognized that the Foreign Emoluments Clause constitutes a restraint.  See 
second dissent at 323 (quoting 3 The Debates in the Several State 
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 465 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (“The [Foreign Emoluments Clause] restrains any 
person in office from accepting of any present or emolument, title or office, 




 179 In re Trump, 958 F.3d at 288. 
 180 President Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 7, 1903). 
 181 U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 8 (requiring the President to state that “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) 
that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my 
Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”).  
 182 In re Trump, 958 F.3d at 288. 
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But neither of the clauses apply if the payments or profits ae sourced from 
private entities, foreign or domestic.  Exercising its role
183
 as the neutral arbiter 
and defender of the law within the executive branch,
184
 the OLC would have 
opined that any financial gain secured by President Trump that was from 
private hands would be lawful and not subject to congressional approval under 
the foreign emoluments clause or prohibited outright by the domestic clause 




 183 Arthur H. Garrison, Law and Politics in the Aftermath of 9/11: Understanding the Interaction of 
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and Policy Theory, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (2014); Arthur H. Garrison, The Role of the OLC 
in Providing Legal Advice to the Commander-in-Chief After September 11th: The Choices Made by 
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 184 Arthur H. Garrison, The Opinions by the Attorney General and the Office of Legal Counsel: How 
and Why They Are Significant, 76 ALB. L. REV. 217 (2012); Arthur H. Garrison, The Office of 
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